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1. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This brief is filed by Plaintiffs-Respondents Dale and Kathleen Latin, Tyler and Kathy 
Chase, and Kenneth and Taffy Stone ("Respondents"). This appeal concerns a roadway dispute 
between Defendant/Appellant Adams County and Adams County Commissioners Bill Brown, 
Joe Holmes, and Mike Paradis ("Appellants") and Respondents. The dispute arose between the 
Appellants and Respondents when the Appellants attempted to make Burch Lane ("Burch 
Lane"), formerly known as Old Sawmill Road, a public road. Respondents filed a quiet title 
action in the district court, to declare that Burch Lane was a private road, for their use and benefit 
only. The Appellants brought the present appeal to reverse the trial court's determination that 
Burch Lane was a private road. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Respondents filed their original Complaint on February 29,2008, seeking declaratory 
relief as to the private status of Burch Lane, injunctive relief to enjoin Appellants from entering 
onto, attempting to maintain andlor attempting to control Burch Lane, and quiet title to Burch 
Lane. (R., Val. I, pp. 3-12). 
Appellants filed an Answer on April 8,2008 admitting some and denying the reminder of 
Respondent's facts and requests for relief. (R., Vol. I, pp. 13-14). 
Approximately three months later, on July 15,2008, Respondents filed a Motion for 
Summary Judgment. (R., Val. I, pp. 15-16). The motion was supported by the Affidavit of 
Tyler Chase (R., Val. 1, pp. 30-43), and the Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 17-29). Appellants responded by filing their Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on August 15,2008. (R., Val. I, pp. 44- 
47). Accompanying their opposition, Appellants also filed the Affidavits of Maxine 
Nichols (R., Vol. 1, pp. 48-49), Steve Shumway (R., Vol. I, pp. 50-52), Paul E. Nichols (R., Vol. 
1, pp. 53-54), Nelma Green (R., Vol. I ,  pp. 55-59), and Don Horton (R., Vol. 1, pp. 60-73). 
Upon receipt of the Affidavits, Respondents immediately filed a Motion to Strike various 
portions of the affidavits filed by Appellants because they contained inadmissible evidence. (R., 
Vol. 1, p. 75-91). Although a motion for order shortening time was filed with the district court to 
address the motion to strike, the district court did not hear the motion before entering summary 
judgment in favor of Respondents. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 92-95). 
Respondents also filed their Reply Memorandum with the district court on August 26, 
2008. (R., Vol. 1, pp. 96-101). Along with the Reply Memorandum, Respondents also 
submitted additional affidavits of Christy Ward (R., Vol. 1, pp. 102-105), Kathy Chase (R., Vol. 
1, pp. 106-109). No objections were filed or made with regard to the additional affidavits by 
Appellants or the district court. 
A hearing was held on September 2,2008, and at that hearing, the district court granted 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 3). An Order Granting Summruy 
Judgment was filed on September 9,2008, (R., Vol. 1, pp. 110-1 11) and on September 30,2008, 
Judgment was entered and filed by the district court, adjudging and decreeing that Burch Lane 
was not a public road. (R., Vol. I, pp. 1 12-1 14) 
Appellants timely filed a Notice of Appeal on October 14,2008. (R., Vol. I, pp. 115- 
116). 
C. Concise Statement of Pacts 
Respondents are all real property owners in the Reico Subdivision in Adams County, 
Idaho. Access to their property is obtained via Burch Lane, formerly known as Old Sawmill 
Road, which is located on Respondents' property. From its creation to the present time, 
Burch Lane has been aprivate road. (R., Vol. 1, p. 31,11. 13-14). 
Historically, Reico Subdivision was part of a 250 acre parcel of property owned by a 
local rancher, Ms. Anna M. Thompson. (R., Vol. 1, p. 32,11.4-5). She acquired the property on 
April 27, 1922 from the United States Government. (R., Vol. 1, p. 32,ll. 5-6). At that time, 
Burch Lane did not exist. Burch Lane (or its predecessor) did not come into existence until after 
Thompson acquired the property. (R., Vol. 1,ll. 7-9). During her ownership of the property, she 
permitted a local logger to construct temporary roads on the property for logging purposes. 
These logging roads were never opened to the public. (R., Vol. 1,ll. 10-12). Ms. Thompson, 
then known as Anna M. Johnson, passed the property to Ira F. Mink on November 3, 1930. He 
subsequently conveyed it to Lawrence Stover on June 17, 1942. (R. Vol. 1,ll. 13-15). 
In April of 1974, the property was subdivided and the developers entered into real estate 
purchase and sale contracts with various individuals for the sale of the subdivided lots. (R., Vol. 
1,ll. 16-17). The property was not properly platted by the original developers so the Adams 
County Recorder involuntarily recorded the plat to finalize the subdivision. The involuntary plat 
was signed by the Adams County Recorder on September 26, 1983. (R., Vol. 32,ll. 21-23, pp. 
38-39). The plat was signed by the Reico Subdivision original developers, but at that time, they 
had already sold some or all of the lots in Reico Subdivision to third party purchasers. 
Despite the fact that the developers did not own all of the property in the subdivision, 
they purportedly certified, "that any right, title and interest that we may have in the road rights- 
of-wav as shown on this plat of REICO SUBDIVISION is hereby dedicated to the use of the 
public." (R., Vol. 1, p. 39) (emphasis added). The easements and road rights-of-way on the plat 
are depicted in the Legend as "- - - - - -," while other roads are depicted with a centerline 
depiction according to the Legend as " 
- 
". (R., Vol. 1, p. 38). Furthermore, the 
easements and rights-of-way are clearly marked on the plat with language such as "EXISTING 
ACCESS EASEMENT" and "R.O.W. BOUNDARY COUNTY ROAD." (R., Vol. 1, p. 38). 
Burch Lane does not have an easement or right-of-way designation identifying it, but merely a 
centerline depiction of its location within the subdivision. 
When the Reico Subdivision was platted, the temporary logging roads created during Ms. 
Thompson's ownership were no longer in use (R., Vol. I, p. 32,ll. 19-20) and were not listed on 
the plat as easements or rights-of-way. The plat indicated two roads that were "easements" but 
the plat was silent as to the characterization of Burch Lane. 
Up until the mid 1980s, Burch Lane was a jeep trail with large trees in the roadway. (R., 
Vol. 1, p. 103,ll. 16-17, p. 107,ll. 16-17). Respondent Lattin's predecessor, Christy Ward, and 
Respondents Chase, relocated a portion of the road and improvements in order to access their 
properties. (R., Vol. 1, p. 103,l. 1 I). 
In 1984, Idaho Power installed utility lines and improved Burch Lane at the expense of 
Chase and Ward. Idaho Power then constructed a power substation on the adjacent forest service 
property. In 2002, Idaho Power obtained an easement Erom Respondents and their predecessors 
to drive over Burch Lane to maintain its substation to the north of Respondents' property in the 
Payette National Forest. (R., Vol. 1, p. 33,ll. 2-9). Since 1984, Burch Lane has been maintained 
exclusively by the Respondents, their predecessors and Idaho Power. (R., Vol. 1, p. 33,11. 10- 
11). 
Eventually, Respondents began having trouble with unauthorized use of Burch Lane by 
the general public. Thus, they installed signs on their property indicating the private nature of 
the road as well as a Burch Lane sign. (R., Vol. 1, p. 33,ll. 17-18). In July of 2007, the 
Appellants sent a letter to Respondents, demanding the removal of the signs. In order to avoid 
problems with the County, the signs designating the road as Burch Lane and a private drive were 
removed. (R., Vol. 1, p. 33,ll. 19-22, pp. 41-42). 
On or about December 17,2007, the Commissioners sent a letter to Respondents, 
asserting that Burch Lane was a public road pursuant to R.S. 2477 andlor by prescription. (R., 
Vol. 1, p.34,11. 1-3, p. 43). The County did not historically maintain Burch Lane. In January of 
2008 the Commissioners directed the County Highway District to begin maintaining Burch Lane. 
Respondents objected to the maintenance by the County Highway District. Respondents have 
and will continue to maintain Burch Lane as a private road, as it has been since it was 
constructed. (R., Vol. 1, p. 34,ll. 4-9). 
At no time between 1979 to the time of the filing of Respondents' lawsuit, did the 
Respondents pursue validation proceedings or condemnation proceedings regarding Burch Lane. 
@., Vol. 1, p. 103,ll. 21-22, p. 104,ll. 1-3). Furthermore, Adams County never made any 
improvements or repairs to or did any maintenance on Burch Lane from 1979 to present. (R., 
Vol. 1, p. 33,ll. 10-1 1). 
111. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the District Court err when it granted summary judgment, quieting title to the access 
road located on Respondent's property, finding that it was a private road? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
When the appellate court reviews the district court's ruling on a motion for summary 
judgment, it employs the same standard as district court's original ruling on the motion. Farrell 
v. Bd. ofcomm'rs. Of Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378, 64 P.3d 304 (2002); King v. Lang, 136 
Idaho 905, 42 P.2d 698 (2002). A motion for summary judgment is properly granted if no 
genuine issue of material fact exists. I.R.C.P. 56(c); Orthman v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 
597,600, 944 P.2d 1360, 1363 (1997). The Court liberally construes the record in the iight most 
favorable to the non-moving party, drawing all reasonable inferences and conclusions in that 
party's favor. Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205,998 P.2d 11 18 (2002). When the court sits 
as the trier of fact, however, the judge is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party 
opposing a motion for summary judgment. Rather the judge is free to arrive at the most probable 
inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts. Id.; Riverside Development Co. v. 
Richie, 103 Idaho 515,519,650 P.2d 657,661 (1982). 
A "material fact" for summary judgment purposes is one upon which the outcome of the 
case may be different. Peterson v. Romine, 131 Idaho 537,540,960 P.2d 1266, 1269 (1998). 
Raising doubts as to a material fact is not sufficient because the nonmoving party must produce 
substantial evidence that demonstrates a material fact is in dispute, a mere scintilla of evidence is 
not sufficient. Ambrose v. Buhl Joint School District #412, 126 Idaho 581,583,887 P.2d 1088, 
1091 (Ct. App. 1994). 
In their brief, Appellants incorrectly direct this Court to Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 
129 P.3d 1223 (2006), regarding the standard of review for appealing trial court findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. In this case, there was no trial and the district court properly declined to 
make any findings of fact or conclusions of law when it granted Respondents' motion for 
summary judgment. Appellants have a misunderstanding of the status of this case, the judgment 
that was entered, and how this Court should review the district court's limited decision in this 
case. The district court made a determination that Appellants failed to establish a genuine issue 
of material fact upon a motion for summary judgment and the district court entered judgment as 
a matter of law.' Thus, this Court does not have to determine if the "district court's findings of 
fact are supported by substantial and competent, though conflicting evidence" as alleged by 
 el ell ants.^ There were no such findings or conclusions that would prompt this alternate 
standard of review. 
B. The Reico Subdivision Plat Does Not Dedicate Burch Lane 
Burch Lane is a private road providing ingress and egress to the properties along Burch 
Lane in Reico Subdivision. The subdivision plat for Reico Subdivision excludes Burch Lane 
from the "easements and rights-of-way" of the subdivision, thus the County cannot accept Burch 
Lane as a public road. 
I. Idaho Code 5 50-1309 Dedications 
Appellants correctly refer to Idaho Code Section 50-1309 as the relevant statute regarding 
' The district court held, "[Adams County] has to follow certain statutory protocols in order to accomplish that, and 
I'm satisfied that, based upon the affidavits submitted and the supporting instruments and the pleadings of the 
parties in union with argument, that Adams County has not followed the statutory protocols for acceptance or 
validation of what's now commonly known as Burch Lane, and simply as a matter of law, I'm going to grant 
summary judgment to the petitioners herein." (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 20, 11. 14-23) (emphasis added). 
See Appellants' Brief, p. 2. 
plats; however, they incorrectly assert that Burch Lane was dedicated in the subdivision plat 
pursuant to that statute. When a plat is recorded, it must include an express dedication of the 
roadways therein. Idaho Code Section 50-1309 states as follows: 
1.  The owner or owners of the land included in said plat shall make a certificate 
containing the correct legal description of the land, with the statement as to their 
intentions to include the same in the plat, and make a dedication of all public 
streets and rights-of-way shown on said plat, which certificate shall be 
acknowledged before an officer duly authorized to take acknowledgments and 
shall be indorsed on the plat. The professional land surveyor making the survey 
shall certify the correctness of said plat and he shall place his seal, signature and 
date on the plat. 
2. No dedication or transfer of a private road to the public can be made without 
the specific approval of the appropriate public highway agency accepting such 
private road. 
3. Highway districts shall not have iurisdiction over private roads 
desi~nated as such on subdivision plats and shall assume no resrtonsibititv for 
the design, inspection, construction, maintenance andlor repair of private 
roads. 
I.C. § 50-1309 (emphasis added). In this case, Reico Subdivision was not properly platted and 
had to be involuntarily recorded by the Adams County Recorder's Office. The property owners 
in the subdivision did not designate any roads as public rights-of-way, nor did the owners 
dedicate any private roads for public us'e. Two roads are labeled on the plat at "existing access 
easement" and one road is identified as "R.O.W." or right-of-way. Burch Lane has no such 
designation. Thus, there is no interpretation for the characterization of Burch Lane for anything 
other than a private road. Accordingly, Adams County has no jurisdiction over Burch Lane 
according to the relevant statute. 
ii. The Reico Subdivision Plat is Not Ambiguous 
Appellants contend that the Reico Subdivision Plat is ambiguous because it does not 
define Burch Lane as an easement or right-of-way. They then incorrectly cite Arreguin v. 
Farmers Insurance Company, 145 Idaho 459,180 P.3d 498 (2008), and Newgen v. OK Livestock 
Exchange, 1 17 Idaho 445 (I 990), to suggest that interpreting plats with ambiguities presents a 
question of fact.3 Appellants acknowledge that a plat is not a contract, but assert that the general 
rules of contract apply. Appellants' assertion is incorrect. 
Dedication is the setting aside of real property for the use or ownership of others. Sun 
Valley Land and Minerals, Inc. v. Kelsey, 138 Idaho 543,66 P.3d 798 (2003). Dedication can be 
made by recording or filing a subdivision plat; however, there has to be a clear and unequivocal 
indication the owner intends to dedicate the land as depicted. Id at 548,66 P.3d at 803. In 
determining whether the owner intended to offer the land for dedication, the court must examine 
the plat, as well as surrounding circumstances and conditions of the development and sale of lots. 
Id,  (citing Dunham v. Hackney Airpark, Inc., 133 Idaho 613,616,990 P.2d 1224,1226 (Ct. 
App. 1999)). The depiction of a road on a plat, without designation, does not, of itself, indicate 
an intent to dedicate the road. Dunham, 133 Idaho at 618, 990 P.2d at 1228. 
The district court held as a matter of law that Appellants had not established that Adams 
County went through the proper protocols in validating or accepting Burch Lane as a public road. 
The district court did not make any factual findings, as suggested by Appellants, regarding the 
Reico Subdivison plat.4 As stated previously, it is not the role of the district court to make 
findings of fact and conclusions of law on a motion for summary judgment, but to determine if 
there are any genuine issues of material fact which would preclude the entry ofjudgment as a 
matter of law. It is the responsibility of the non-moving party to present any genuine issues of 
material fact to preclude summary judgment. Appellants failed to present any facts that would 
raise an issue relating to the subdivision plat. 
3 See Appellants' Brief, p. 5. 
4 See Appellant's Brief, p. 5,stating, "The district court simply did not find enough facts to warrant summary 
judgment." 
Respondents, on the other hand, set forth undisputed facts that the lots in Reico 
Subdivision were being sold in the 1970s, yet the plat was not recorded until January 4, 1984, 
after several lots were already sold. The plat clearly identifies two roads as "easements" and 
another road as a "right-of-way" but it does not identify Burch Lane as either an easement or a 
right-of-way. To the contrary, the plat is silent as to Burch Lane. If the developers of the Reico 
Subdivision, or the owners of the property when the plat was recorded in 1984, wanted Burch 
Lane to be dedicated, the plat would have indicated accordingly. Following the direct case law 
on point, Dunham and Sun Valley Landand Minerals, silence as to the characterization does not 
amount to a dedication. To the contrary, the owners and developers of Reico Subdivision were 
required to "clearly and unequivocally" dedicate the road in the plat. Because the plat is clear 
and unambiguous, there is no doubt that Burch Lane is not depicted as an easement or right-of- 
way which could be dedicated pursuant to Idaho Code Section 50-1309. 
There are no genuine issues of material fact regarding the plat for Reico Subdivision and 
the fact that Burch Lane was not dedicated to the public for public use. Accordingly, this Court 
should affirm the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents. 
C. Appellants Did Not Comply With Idaho's Road Creation Statute 
In Idaho, counties and highway districts can only declare public roadways on private land 
according to the restrictions set forth in the Idaho Code. A "highway" is defined in the Idaho 
Code as: 
"Highways" means roads, streets, alleys and bridges laid out or recorded for the 
public or dedicated or abandoned to the public. . . . Roads laid out and recorded 
as highways, by order of the commissioners, and all roads used as such for a 
period of five (5) years, provided they shall have been worked and kept up at the 
expense of the public, or located and recorded by order of a board of 
commissioners, are highways. 
LC. 3 40-109(5).~ In Idaho, it is not enough for Commissioners to simply "declare" a road to be 
public if it lies on private property. To the contrary, the county must initiate validation 
proceedings on roads that are not part of the historical highway system. 
I. Validation Proceedings 
The road creation statute requires the county or highway district to comply with Idaho 
Code Section 40-203(A) when attempting to validate a public road. The statute reads as follows: 
(1) Any resident or property holder within a county or highway 
district system, including the state of Idaho or any of its subdivisions, or any 
agency of the federal government, may petition the board of countv or 
highway district commissioners, whichever shall have iurisdiction of the 
highway system, to initiate public proceedin~s to validate a highway or 
public right-of-way. . . 
(2) If proceedings for validation of a highway or public right-of-way 
are initiated, the commissioners shall follow the procedure set forth in 
section 40-203. Idaho Code . . . 
(3) Upon completion of the proceedings, the c o m m i s s i o n e r s a  
determine whether validation of the highway or public right-of-way is in 
the public interest and shall enter an order validating the highway or 
public right-of-way as public or declaring it not to be public. 
. . . 
(5) When a board of commissioners validates a highway or public 
right-of-way, it shall cause the order validating the highway or public 
right-of-way, and if surveyed, cause the survey to be recorded in the county 
records and shall amend the official highway system map of the respective 
county or highway district. 
. . . 
(7) This section does not apply to the validation of any highway, 
public street or public right-of-way which is to be accepted as part of a platted 
subdivision pursuant to chapter 13, title 50, Idaho Code. 
LC. 5 40-203A (emphasis added). 
The Idaho legislature made it abundantly clear that the commissioners were obligated to 
follow the procedures set forth in Idaho Code Section 40-203. The "shall" language in the 
' Appellants incorrectly direct this Court to antiquated and long since repealed law, the 1893 statute relating to road 
creation, asserting that "Idaho's road creation statute has been largely unchanged since 1893." See Appellant's 
Brief, p. 7. To the contrary, the road creation statute has been completely overhauled and the relevant provisions of 
the Idaho Code are very specific regarding how roads can be created. See I.C. $40-201 et seq. 
11 
statute is mandatory, and cannot be waived simply because county commissioners feel strongly 
about the status of the road. In this case, Appellants never initiated validation proceedings for 
Burch Lane and never laid it out on a county map or recorded its existence. To the contrary, 
Burch Lane went completely ignored by the Appellants until 2008 when Respondents changed 
the name from Old Sawmill Road to Burch Lane. There was simply no evidence presented to 
oppose Respondent's motion for summary judgment that would have raised any issues of fact 
regarding what attempts Appellants made to validate Burch Lane. Thus summary judgment was 
appropriate. 
ii. Requirements for Proper Validation 
Even if Appellants had attempted to validate Burch Lane, the validation would have been 
improper. In order to meet the requirements to validate a road as a public road, the statute 
requires that the petitioning party (county or highway district) to establish that the road was 
either (1) laid out and recorded; (2) located and recorded; or (3) used by the public for five years 
and maintained at the public expense. The code provides: 
(I) The initial selection of the county highway system and highway district 
system may be accomplished in the following manner: 
(3) Highways laid out, recorded and opened as described in subsection (2) of 
this section, by order of a board of commissioners, and all highways used for a 
period of five (5) years, provided they shall have been worked and kept up at 
the expense of the public, or located and recorded by order of a board of 
commissioners, are highways. If a highway created in accordance with the 
provisions of this subsection is not opened as described in subsection (2) of this 
section, there shall be no duty to maintain that highway, nor shall there be any 
liability for any injury or damage for failure to maintain it or any highway signs, 
until the highway is designated as a part of the county or highway district system 
and opened to public travel as a highway. 
(4) When a public right-of-way is created in accordance with the provisions 
of subsection (2) of this section, or section 40-203 or 40-203A. Idaho Code, 
there shall be no duty to maintain that public right-of-way, nor shall there be any 
liability for any injury or damage for failure to maintain it or any highway signs. 
. . . 
I.C. 3 40-202 (emphasis added). 
Although the statute contemplates that a road is public if it is "used for a period of five 
(5) years, provided they shall have been worked and kept up at the expense of the public", the 
Idaho case law narrowly construes the statute and imposes stricter requirements for use and 
maintenance prior to allowing validation of a road as public. 
In order to determine whether a road is deemed to be a public road pursuant to Idaho 
Code Section 40-202(3), the commissioners must consider the following: (1) the frequency of the 
public use; (2) the nature of the use; (3) the quality of the use; (4) whether the use was more than 
casual and desultory; (5) whether or not permission was granted for use; and (6) whether or not 
the use and maintenance was by agreement. Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9, 784 P.2d 339 (Ct. 
App. 1989). The burden is on the petitioner to establish that the road is a public road. Cox v. 
Cox, 84 Idaho 513,519,373 P.3d 929,932 (1962). 
In Cox v. Cox, an access road existed taking off from a county road. Where the access 
road left the county road, a gate and cattle guards had been maintained for several years, 
restricting access over the road. The plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant for 
trespass, and the defendant counterclaimed that the access road was public, or that she had a 
prescriptive right to use the access road. The trial court determined that the road was not a 
public road because the maintenance was sporadic and the gate limited access by the public, and 
the Supreme Court affirmed that finding. 
In Roberts v. Swim, supra, the Court of Appeals confirmed the requirements in order to 
establish a public road under Idaho Code Section 40-202 and 40-203. The court held as follows: 
The main factual issues subsumed by the question of whether a road may be 
declared a public roadway are the "frequency, nature and quality of the public's 
use and maintenance of the road and the intentions of the landowners and county 
relevant to the use and maintenance." A showing must be made that the 
public's use was more than onlv casual and desultorv. Regular maintenance 
and extensive public use are sufficient to establish the existence of the public 
status of the roadway. The maintenance of the road by a public agency and the 
use by the public must be for a period of five years. Such maintenance need only 
consist of work and repairs that are reasonably necessary; it need not be 
aerformed in each of five consecutive years nor through the entire length of the 
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road. The intention of the county in maintaining the road must not be merely 
to provide gratuitous aid to the landowner. 
Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho at 16, 784 P.2d at 346 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). In 
Roberts, the court confirmed that no public rights were established in the road in that case. 
Furthermore, when dealing with the same validation issues, the court in Burrup v. 
Stanger, 114 Idaho 50, 753 P.2d 261 (Ct. App. 1988) stated as follows: 
The remaining factual questions relate to the intentions of the landowners and 
of the county relevant to use and maintenance. Objective manifestations of 
intent include designating the road as a public highway by order of the proper 
public authorities; recording the road as a public highway by order of the 
board of county commissioners; and the regular maintenance of the road by 
public expenditure. The facts must demonstrate that minor maintenance 
or snow removal, done bv the public road crews. was not a mere 
gratuitous aid to the local landowners or citizens. Likewise, it must be 
shown that the aublic agency has not ex~resslv agreed to maintain the 
roadway while continuing to recognize it as private. in exchange for 
certain, limited ~ u b l i c  use. thereby not intending to create or assert rights 
greater than those allowed in the agreement. Correspondingly, it must be 
demonstrated that the public's use of the road was not merely the result of 
permission given by the owner, as opposed to acquiescence of the owner. 
When the facts of use, maintenance and intention satisfy the above principles, 
the law under I.C. 3 40-202 operates to make the road public. 
Burrup, 114 Idaho at 53,753 P.2d at 264 (citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
Recently, this Court has held that "public status of a roadway can be established by =f 
of regular maintenance and extensive aublic use" so long as the elements set forth in Burrup 
v. Stanger and Roberts v. Swim are met. Ada County Highway District v. Total Success 
Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360,366,179 P.3d 323,329 (2008) (emphasis added). 
In this case, Appellants failed to establish that Adams County ever maintained Burch 
Lane. Appellants M h e r  failed to establish that Burch Lane had extensive public use. To the 
contrary, the affidavits filed in opposition to Respondents' motion for summary judgment only 
establish that a few local landowners used Burch Lane, on occasion, to pick berries or go for 
walks in the forest. Not one single affidavit was filed to establish that the county had ever 
maintained Burch Lane and not one single affidavit was filed to rebut Respondents' 
characterization of Burch Lane. 
iii. Maintenance at the Public's Expense is Required 
Rather than providing evidence that would create a genuine issue of material fact, 
Appellants simply urge this Court to adopt a theory that the county need not show that it ever 
maintained Burch Lane because the case law of Idaho does not require i t6  Appellants rely on 
State v. Berg, 28 Idaho 724, 155 P. 968 (1916), to support this allegation. First and foremost, 
State v. Berg is a criminal case and should not be relied upon when determining the status of the 
law in this road case. (See Carbon v. Moon, 68 Idaho 385,389, 195 P.2d 351,355 (1948) (the 
facts in the criminal action did not apply to that particular road case). Moreover, the portion of 
State v. Berg relied upon by Appellants was based on a statute that has been amended several 
times over. (See State v. Nesbitt, 79 Idaho 1,8,310 P.2d 787,794 (1957) ("It therefore follows 
that the law as it existed in 1893 and prior thereto, as to roads becoming such when so used for 
the prescriptive period of five years, cannot be applied herein.") 
The current requirements for road creation under Idaho law have been set forth in detail 
above with Idaho Code Sections 40-202 and 203, and the extensive amount of case law that 
See Appellants' Brief, p. 7. 
succeeded State v. Berg. A board of commissioners only has such powers as are expressly or 
impliedly conferred upon it by statute. Floyd v. Brd of Comm'rs ofBonneville County, 137 
Idaho 718,723,52 P.3d 863,868 (2002).~ Appellants proposition that maintenance need not be 
shown is simply not the law of Idaho today. Further, Appellants have failed to give any reasons 
to this Court why the current law regarding road creation should be reconsidered by this Court. 
Similar to their argument regarding the plat, Appellants incorrectly assert that the district 
court "did not make specific findings of fact with regard to the use of the road." Again, this 
appeal stems from an order granting summary judgment to Respondents. The district court was 
not in a position to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. The role of the district court 
was simply to determine as whether or not there were any genuine issues of material fact that 
would preclude sunlmary judgment. For this reason, Appellants' reliance on Hodgins v. Sales, 
139 Idaho 225,229,76 P.3d 969,970 (2003) is misplaced? The Appellants were required to set 
forth any genuine issue of material Eact regarding the status of Burch Lane, its use, or the 
county's maintenance through affidavits. (See I.R.C.P. 56). Appellants failed to do so. In fact, 
Appellants failed to produce any affidavits from county officials that the county maintained 
Burch Lane at any time prior to the filing of this lawsuit. The Appellants failed to produce any 
admissible evidence at summary judgment that would raise a genuine issue of material fact 
regarding Burch Lane. Thus, it was appropriate for the district court to enter an order granting 
judgment as a matter of law to Respondents, and that decision should be affirmed by this Court. 
Appellants correctly recognize Floydas the status of Idaho law, but Appellants fail to acknowledge that the law 
requires them to maintain Burch Lane in order for it to be properly validated. 
See Appellants' Brief, p. 8. 
Hodgins v. Sales was a case that was tried before the district court, not a summa~y judgment case. 
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IV. ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
The Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41 allow for an award of costs and attorney fees to the 
prevailing party. Attorney fees on appeal are appropriate under I.A.R. 41 if the appellate court is 
left without an abiding belief that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably, or without foundation. Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70, 74, 785 P.2d 634, 
638 (1990). An award of attorney fees is appropriate if the appeal does no more than simply 
invite the appellate court to second-guess the trial court on conflicting evidence, or if the law is 
well settled and the appellant has made no substantial showing that the lower court misapplied 
the law, or on review of discretion, no cogent challenge is presented with regard to the trial 
judge's exercise of discretion. Pass v. Kenny, 118 Idaho 445,449, 767 P.2d 153, 157 (Ct. App. 
1990); Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012,1018,829 P.2d 1361, 1367 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Furthermore, Appellants failed to provide an adequate record to challenge the district 
court's order granting summary judgment. Appellants did not provide the necessary affidavits to 
defeat Respondents' motion for summary judgment, and the affidavits they did file were full of 
inadmissible evidence." Failure to supply an adequate record on appeal results in an appeal not 
well grounded in fact. I.A.R. 11.1; Read v. Harvey, - Idaho -, 209 P.3d 661,668 (2009). 
In the case at bar, Appellants have brought this appeal to second guess the decision of the 
trial court and evidence presented to the district court in determining that Appellants failed to 
establish any genuine issues of material fact which would preclude summary judgment. Because 
Appellants have failed to provide any logical reasons why the district court's decision should be 
disturbed on appeal, and no relevant Idaho case law or statutes have been provided to support 
Respondents filed their Motion to Strike the inadmissible portions of the Appellants' affidavits, however, the 
district court did not rule on that motion prior to granting summary judgment. 
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their allegations that the trial court misapplied the Idaho law with respect to this matter, this 
Court should find that Respondents are the prevailing parties on appeal, and award costs and 
attorneys' fees to Respondents accordingly. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The district court did not e n  when it granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents 
because there existed no genuine issues of material fact, and the district court properly 
determined that the access road was a private road as a matter of law. 
Thus, Respondents respectfully request that this Court uphold the district court's 
decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 3 f lday  of August, 2009. 
PICKENS LAW, P.A. 
By: 
Terri R. Pickens. of the firm 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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